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It has been shown that adolescents take more risks when they are with peers than
when they are alone, presumably because the presence of peers can be a social
reward/punishment that can bias decision making. Competition is inherent in peer
interactions, and recent work has demonstrated that winning/losing is an intrinsic
social reward/punishment. Taken together, it can be hypothesized that competition
amongst peers affects adolescents’ risky behavior. While there is much evidence that
status amongst peers can relate to antisocial/aggressive behavior, it remains unclear
whether risky behavior is affected. Moreover, the degree to which ‘temporary status,’
such as ranking in a short-term competitive game, affects behavior is uncertain, an
important issue because adolescents might be sensitive to situations or factors which
potentially destabilize existing hierarchies. In this experiment, these issues were directly
explored in the classroom environment using smartphone technology and Wi-Fi setup.
Male junior high school students (aged 14–15) performed a roulette game task on
smartphones, playing either independently or against five classmates. In the latter
case, the students’ current ranks within the group of six were constantly presented
on smartphone screens. To dissociate the effects of the students’ reactions to ranks
from their actual performances, unknown to the students, the ranks presented were
actually predetermined so that about half of the students were continuously presented
with high ranks whereas the other half were continuously presented with low ranks. We
found that the students presented with low ranks made more risky plays than those not
presented with ranks or those presented with high ranks. This result suggests that even
temporary status significantly affects adolescents’ risky behavior, and also demonstrates
the usefulness of smartphones in examining and manipulating peer interactions in
classroom experiments.
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INTRODUCTION
It has been shown that adolescents are inclined to engage in risky
behavior, potentially resulting in serious problems (Steinberg,
2008; Somerville and Casey, 2010; Reyna and Brainerd, 2011;
Defoe et al., 2015), and it has also been found that this tendency
for risky behavior is enhanced by the presence of peers (Steinberg,
2008). Specifically, adolescents are more likely to make risky
decisions (Gardner and Steinberg, 2005; Smith et al., 2014) and
are more sensitive to immediate reward (O’Brien et al., 2011;
Weigard et al., 2014) when knowing that they are being observed
by peers than when they are alone. It has been suggested that these
effects appear because the presence of peers can constitute a social
reward that can bias decision making, presumably through the
modulation of the reward system in the brain (Chein et al., 2011).
It is striking that even the mere presence of peers can
affect risky behavior (Gardner and Steinberg, 2005). Naturally,
when peers are present, they generally also interact with one
another, making it important to examine the effects of peer
interactions in detail. Indeed, a recent study has shown that
peer observation and peer advice have distinguishable effects
on risky decision making (Haddad et al., 2014). Competition
is another typical type of peer interaction. Recent work (in
adults) has shown, through fitting of the behavior in an auction
task by reinforcement learning models, that winning/losing a
competition constitutes an intrinsic social reward/punishment,
independent of monetary outcome, while also suggesting neural
and hormonal substrates (van den Bos et al., 2013a,b). Taken
together with the abovementioned suggestion that peer presence
affects risky behavior by modulating the reward system, we
hypothesized that awareness of one’s place in competitive
interactions amongst peers would further modulate the reward
system, and potentially affect risky behavior more. It was difficult,
however, to specify exact expectations of the possible effects
from the studies introduced above; we discuss this issue in
relation to a wider behavioral economics literature in the Section
“Discussion.”
Much evidence shows that peer status or hierarchies can
be related to antisocial or aggressive behavior in adolescents
and children (Coie et al., 1982; Xie et al., 2002; Prinstein and
Cillessen, 2003). However, it remains unclear whether and how
risky decision making is affected by these interpersonal dynamics.
While previous studies typically examine established hierarchies
and their long term changes, it is an open question whether
and how temporary status, such as ranking in a competitive
game, can affect behavior. This is an important issue to examine
as adolescents might be more sensitive to temporary status
changes than adults given their potential to destabilize existing
hierarchies, resulting in the higher levels of risky behavior
observed. To date, these temporary status changes and their
effects have been technically challenging to examine in their real
world environments (i.e., the classroom). In the present work,
we directly tackle this issue using the advantages offered by
smartphone devices.
Specifically, we examined risky decision making behavior
in adolescents in the classroom environment where they were
surrounded by their actual peers. A total of 131 junior high
school male students (aged 14–15 years old) performed a roulette
task, similar to the one used in a previous study (Smith et al.,
2014), implemented on smartphone devices. Participants were
presented with a series of roulette wheels showing the probability
of gain and loss, and decided whether to ‘play’ or ‘pass’ for each
wheel. Half of the students performed the task independently
while the other half played against five unidentified classmates.
In the latter case, students’ current ranks within their group of
six were continuously presented on the smartphone displays. In
order to dissociate the effects of the students’ reactions to ranks
from their actual performances, the ranks presented were not
real: unbeknownst to the students, ranks were predetermined so
that about half of the students were continuously presented with
fluctuating high ranks whereas the other half were continuously
presented with fluctuating low ranks. Students were led to believe
that ranks were calculated in real time through Wi-Fi networks
set up in the classrooms at the time of the experiment.
We hypothesized that the real-time presentation of ranks
amongst peers would modulate participants’ tendencies to make
risky choices, or more specifically, that presentation of low ranks,
or high ranks, or both would increase the ratio of choosing ‘play’
especially for roulette wheels with non-positive expected values
(EVs: X × Pgain(X) - Y × P loss(Y), where X and Y are the point
amounts that can be gained or lost and Pgain(X) and P loss(Y)
are the probabilities of gain and loss, respectively; the EV of a
given roulette wheel is approximately the average point amount
obtained by playing that wheel many times). A previous study
using a similar roulette task (Smith et al., 2014) showed that the
presence of peers increases the ratio of choosing ‘play’ for roulette
wheels with negative EVs, and called this an increase of risk-
taking caused by the presence of peers. This usage of the word
‘risk’ includes the meaning ‘disadvantageous,’ and differs from
the usage of (pure) ‘risk’ in the fields of behavioral economics,
where (pure) ‘risk’ refers to the variance/variability of outcomes
and is conceptually orthogonal to EV (c.f., Defoe et al., 2015).
According to the definition of pure risk in behavioral economics,
‘play’ for the roulette wheel with EV = 0 is riskier than ‘pass,’
while ‘playing’ on roulette wheels with negative [positive] EVs is
both riskier and more disadvantageous [advantageous] (in terms
of EV) than ‘pass.’ Considering these, outcomes of all roulette
wheels are examined but we attend specifically to ‘play’ ratios for
roulette wheels with non-positive EVs.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Data was collected from a group of 131 participants (adolescent
male students, aged 14–15 years old) made up of three
whole classes (45, 42, and 44 students) in the 3rd year
of a junior high school in Osaka, Japan. One week prior
to the start of the experiment, parents of students were
distributed a document via students about the voluntary nature
of the study and its contents (including the presentation of
manipulated information related to relative ranks of accuracy
rates, but without explanatory details about what they might
be) and given the option to withdraw their children from
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 January 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 16
fpsyg-08-00016 January 20, 2017 Time: 14:32 # 3
Foo et al. Peer Competition Affects Adolescent Risk Taking
participation if they so desired (none did so). On the day
of the experiment, the voluntary nature of the study and the
contents of the experiment (excluding the falseness of the
presented ranks) were explained to participants and written
informed consent was obtained from all participants. Students
were told that the outcomes of the experiment would not affect
their school grades in any way. Participants were not paid
for their participation in the experiment. The research ethics
committee at the University of Tokyo approved of the present
study.
Roulette Task Paradigm
We implemented a roulette risky decision making task similar to
the one used in prior work (Smith et al., 2014) in smartphone
devices (described in detail below). Participants chose to either
‘play’ or ‘pass’ on virtually spinning a roulette wheel based on
information displayed on a color-coded roulette wheel graphic
(Figure 1A, left panel). The number of points at stake each
trial was indicated in the center of the roulette wheel, while the
different colors on the wheel indicated probability of gain/loss
(blue = gain, red = loss, gray = zero). There were five
different configurations of gain/loss probabilities (Figure 1B,
Table 1). In this experiment, the exact probabilities were not
displayed to promote intuitive decision making rather than
explicit calculation of the EVs (and also to control for potential
individual differences in calculation ability). The point amounts
which could be gained or lost on each trial by playing were:
1000, 1500 and 2000 and 0 (for each of the five probability
configurations), resulting in a variety of EVs (Figure 1C, Table 1).
If ‘pass’ was selected, 0 points would be obtained on that trial.
On each trial, participants were given 2000 ms to choose
whether to play or pass upon which the button they pressed
was highlighted in red (Figure 1A, middle panel). The task was
synchronized across participants; regardless of response time, the
result was not shown until the full 2000 ms had passed. Results
of the trial were then displayed for 1000 ms (Figure 1A, right
panel), along with a graphic showing the final position of the
roulette wheel. This was followed immediately by the beginning
of the subsequent trial. Participants were instructed to do their
best to maximize their point totals. If no responses were recorded
during 2000 ms response window, choice options were grayed out
until the next trial. Participants were told that there was a penalty
for failing to respond in time, and time-out trials were excluded
from the analysis. The total number of accumulated points was
displayed at the end of the session.
The experimental session was comprised of 120 trials, lasting
∼6 min. The trial order was the same across all participants.
A 20-trial training session preceded the main experiment to get
participants accustomed to the task.
Presentation of Rank
All participants in each class performed the task at the same time.
Participants were grouped into ‘No-Rank’ and ranked groups.
Participants in the ‘No-Rank’ group played the task with no
rank displayed. Ranked participants ‘competed’ in groups of 6
but were unaware of the identities of their ‘competitors.’ In
the ranked group, ranks were displayed on their smartphone
FIGURE 1 | Roulette task and rank presentation. (A) Task paradigm.
Participants chose to either ‘play’ or ‘pass’ (by pressing a corresponding
button) based on information visualized by a color-coded roulette wheel. The
number of points at stake each trial was indicated in the center of the roulette
wheel, while the different colors indicated probability of gain/loss (blue = gain,
red = loss, gray = zero). There were also participants who performed the task
independently without rank presentation: ‘Current Rank’ was not presented
for them. (B) Five different configurations of the gain/loss probabilities of
roulette wheels. The point amounts which could be gained or lost on each trial
by playing were 1000, 1500, 2000, or 0 for each of the five probability
configurations (shown are the cases with 1000 points). (C) Expected values
(EVs) of the presented roulettes. (D) Pre-determined false rank patterns. There
were two grand-patterns: one was continuously at high ranks (1st or 2nd) and
the other was continuously at low ranks (5th or 6th) except for the initial and
last ∼10 trials. For the last ∼10 trials, both the high-rank and low-rank
grand-patterns further differentiated into three sub-patterns ending with 1st,
2nd, or 3rd rank and 4th, 5th, or 6th rank, respectively, as shown in the figure.
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TABLE 1 | Probabilities of gain and loss, and variations in the expected values (EVs), for each roulette wheel.
Roulette-wheel
with gain:
loss = 2 : 1
(36% : 18%)
Roulette-wheel
with gain:
loss = 5 : 3
(45% : 27%)
Roulette-wheel
with gain:
loss = 1 : 1
(37% : 37%)
Roulette-wheel
with gain:
loss = 4 : 5
(36% : 46%)
Roulette-wheel
with gain:
loss = 1 : 2
(15% : 31%)
Points at stake ± 1000 181 181 0 −91 −154
Points at stake ± 1500 272 272 0 −137 −231
Points at stake ± 2000 362 362 0 −182 −308
screen throughout the experimental session; unknown to these
students, ranks were actually predetermined and fluctuated over
the experiment based on a preset schedule. This schedule and
outcomes of trials were manipulated so that changes in rank
appeared as natural and plausible as possible. As such, we
included ‘gain’, ‘loss’, and ‘zero’ sections for all roulette wheels
(Figure 1B) (i.e., even if the participants ‘passed’ or got a score
of 0 on a given trial, their rank could change in either direction if
competitors ‘played’).
Ranks were manipulated such that the ranked group contained
two sub-groups: ‘High-Rank’ and ‘Low-Rank.’ For those in the
‘High-Rank’ group, ranks were made to fluctuate between 1st
and 2nd place. For those in the ‘Low-Rank’ group, the displayed
ranks fluctuated between 5th and 6th place. To make the initial
establishment of ranks seem as natural as possible, ranks during
the first 10 trials were made to fluctuate with more frequency
before reaching the established high or low rank. During the final
10 trials leading up to the end of the session, ranks were set to
change such that all ranks from 1 to 6 would all accounted for
(Figure 1D). That is, those in the ‘High-Rank’ group would finish
the session ranked 1st, 2nd, or 3rd, while those in the ‘Low-Rank’
group would end the session ranked 4th, 5th, or 6th.
A number of steps were taken to ensure that students did
not realize that ranks were false. Colored stickers were used to
mark the smartphones of ‘competing’ groups (students with the
same colors competed with each other) but smartphones were
shuﬄed when they were distributed so that a single group was
dispersed within the classroom. This was done to discourage the
students from looking at the devices of the students around them
and instead to focus on their own game, while also allowing
us to keep track of the ‘competing’ groups. Next, we instructed
participants to place the devices flat on their desks, not to look at
other persons’ smartphones, and not to communicate during the
experiment. Screen brightness of devices was set at minimum so
that screens could not be easily seen from the side. In addition,
we set up a laptop computer and Wi-Fi routers at the rear of the
classrooms (but they were not actually used).
We originally planned to have 24 students in the ranked
group per class (four groups of six students) with the remainder
of students in each class being in the ‘No-Rank’ group. Due
to practical issues in device preparation and delivery, in some
cases there were less than six students in a single ‘competing’
group; however, students were not explicitly told this and were
presumably unaware of it as the seats of the students in each
competing group were dispersed as mentioned above. In the end,
65 students were in the ‘No-Rank’ group while 36 students were
in the ‘High-Rank’ group, and 30 students were in the ‘Low-Rank’
group.
Experimental Device and Application
Experiments were carried out on Covia (CP-D02) Android
smartphones (Covia Inc., Yokohama, Japan) running Android
Version 4.0. A custom-made application for presenting
psychological tasks was used. The smartphone application was
designed to be always full-screen such that participants could not
view the device settings and the devices were distributed with the
application already started. During the task, menu buttons were
disabled to prevent any errant presses.
Statistical Analyses
Statistical analyses were conducted using MATLAB (MathWorks
Inc., Natick, MA, USA), including its Statistics Toolbox /
Statistics and Machine Learning Toolbox, the codes in the file
http://www.sbirc.ed.ac.uk/cyril/glm/GLM_lectures.html, which
is a companion to the lectures by Cyril Pernet, and the codes
formerly in http://rnpsychology.org/ (by Ryosuke Niimi), and
also R1. The level of statistical significance was set at p < 0.05.
For each individual participant, we calculated the ratio of ‘play’
(as defined above) for trials that met particular criteria for each
analysis (described in the Results), and compared the across-
participant distributions of the ‘play ratio’ in the three rank
groups (No-Rank, High-Rank, and Low-Rank). For the effect size
measure, we adopted Keselman and colleagues’ dj (see below)
(Keselman et al., 2008; Peng and Chen, 2014), which applies when
normality is confirmed but variances are unequal and sample
sizes are unequal. (instead of the widely used Cohen’s d which
assumes both normality and homogeneity). To be stringent, we
examined all values of dj to get an accurate picture of the effect
size (Keselman et al., 2008; Peng and Chen, 2014).
Keselman and colleagues′dj
dj =
−
X1 −
−
X2
∧
σj
,where
−
X1,
−
X2 = sample means of groups 1 and 2, respectively, and
∧
σj = sample standard deviation of either groups 1 or 2.
1https://www.r-project.org/
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In addition to the analyses based on the play ratio, we
explored sensitivity to differences in EVs in individual trials (11th
to 120th, excluding the initial 10 trials) using a Generalized
Estimating Equation (GEE) (Liang and Zeger, 1986) analysis
in reference to an approach used in a previous study (Weller
et al., 2015). The GEEQBOX toolbox for MATLAB (Ratcliffe
and Shults, 2008)2 was used for GEE analyses. EVs were first
calculated for each experimental trial: probabilities of gain and
loss denoted by roulette wheels (approximate proportions of
colored pixels for gain + loss were extracted from roulette wheel
images and multiplied by gain/loss ratios) were multiplied by
presented point amounts and then summed (Figure 1C; Table 1).
Explicit probabilities were not displayed as it was undesirable
to have participants calculating EVs during the task. Outcomes
were modeled as ‘play’ = 1 and ‘pass’ = 0, and the Bernoulli
distribution assumption was used. As for correlation structure,
the Markov correlation structure was assumed. Covariates of
trials (11th to 120th), normalized EVs [=(EVs - mean across
120 trials)/(standard deviation across 120 trials)], High-Rank
(dummy-coded, i.e., 1 for High-Rank and 0 for No-Rank or Low-
Rank), Low-Rank (dummy-coded, i.e., 1 for Low-Rank and 0 for
No-Rank or High-Rank), interaction terms between normalized
EVs × High-Rank and normalized EVs × Low-Rank, and a
constant term were specified in the model. GEEQBOX provides
two versions of results: a robust covariance matrix-based one
and a model-based covariance matrix-based one. We present the
former because although the Markov structure appeared to be a
natural assumption, it was not known to be the best assumption.
In the GEE analysis described above, High-Rank and Low-
Rank were individually dummy-coded, and therefore a direct
comparison between High-Rank and Low-Rank, as well as
detection of a possible interaction between the Low vs. High
Ranks and EVs, could not be achieved. In order to achieve
these, we conducted a separate GEE analysis on the data of
High-Rank and Low-Rank participants only (i.e., excluding the
No-Rank participants), in which covariates of trials (11th to
120th), normalized EVs, Low-Rank (vs. High-Rank) (dummy-
coded, i.e., 1 for Low-Rank and 0 for High-Rank), interaction
term between normalized EVs× Low-Rank (vs. High-Rank), and
a constant term were specified in the model. Similarly to the
original GEE analysis described above, the Markov correlation
structure was assumed, and the robust covariance matrix-based
results are reported.
Additional Notes
Participants were given instructions by the experimenters, along
with a teacher from the school. All participants completed a
mental health questionnaire. The experiment described here was
part of a larger experiment at the junior high school; before
performing the roulette task, participants performed a different
reinforcement learning task twice (i.e., two sessions), once with
‘false’ rank presentation and once with no rank, for which results
are not described in this report. It was our original intention
to also conduct two sessions of the roulette task, but due to
class period length and time considerations we were only able to
2https://www.jstatsoft.org/article/view/v025i14
conduct a single session, resulting in the current design. Given
these constraints and as it was considered ethically desirable,
participants presented with low rank in the roulette task were
presented with high rank in the reinforcement learning task,
either in the first or second session, and vice versa (except for one
student who was not presented with ranks in the reinforcement
learning task due to a technical issue) so that there was no student
who was presented with only low ranks in both tasks. For the
purpose of the present study, it would have been ideal if we could
counterbalance the possible effects of rank presentation in the
preceding task in such a way that a half of participants presented
with high ranks in the roulette task experienced low ranks in
the preceding task while the other half experienced high ranks
in the preceding task, but we could not do so because of ethical
and practical reasons. Participants presented with no rank in the
roulette task were also presented with a rank in the preceding
task, either high or low ranks in either the first or second session,
and the data of these participants were used to examine possible
effects of the rank presentation in the preceding task (i.e., the
reinforcement learning task) on the behavior in the roulette task
(described in the Results).
Although ranks for experiments were false, scores obtained by
each student were reflective of their true behavior. It is interesting
to note that even though students did not know to which six
person group they belonged, after the experiment was over, they
compared their scores (and ranks where applicable) with people
seated close to them without prompting, showing a natural desire
to confirm their positions amongst their peers. The fact that the
rank was false was explained to the students by their teacher
in a debriefing session several days after the main experiment.
According to the teacher who conducted the debriefing sessions,
the students believed that the ranks had been real and remarked
that without the debriefing, would not have realized that ranks
shown during the experiment were fake (indicating that even
though it might have been possible for the students to read
the document for their parents including description about the
experimental manipulation of presented ranks, they did not do so
or at least did not well understand the meaning of the description
with respect to the task).
RESULTS
The majority of participants in all three rank groups made their
choices (‘play’ or ‘pass’), within the time limit (2 s) in≥90% of the
trials (Figure 2). The remaining participants (four students in the
No-Rank group and two students in the Low-Rank group) were
excluded from subsequent analyses.
For each participant, we calculated the play ratio in the trials
in which roulette wheels with non-positive EVs (the right three
of Figure 1B) were presented and a choice was made. The initial
10 trials during which presented ranks gradually stabilized to
either high or low ranks were excluded from analysis (Figure 1D).
In order to test the effects of rank presentation on risk taking,
we compared the play ratio between the three rank groups
(Figure 3) by conducting one-way ANOVA, finding a significant
effect [p = 0.0217, η2 = 0.0609 (95% confidence interval: lower:
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FIGURE 2 | Histograms of the ratio of trials in which participants made
a choice, either ‘play’ or ‘pass,’ within the time limit (2 s). The three
panels show the histograms for the group without rank presentation
(No-Rank), with high-rank presentation (High-Rank), and with low-rank
presentation (Low-Rank). The vertical dotted lines in each panel indicate the
90% line: the small number of participants (four students in the No-Rank
group and two students in the Low-Rank group) to the left of this line were
excluded from the subsequent analyses.
FIGURE 3 | Histograms of the ratio of choosing ‘play’ in the trials in
which a roulette wheel with non-positive expected value (the right
three of Figure 1B) was presented and a choice was made, excluding
the initial 10 trials during which the presented ranks were gradually
stabilized to either high or low ranks. The three panels show the
histograms for the three rank groups. The dotted lines indicate the means:
0.501 (No-Rank), 0.458 (High-Rank), and 0.634 (Low-Rank). The standard
deviations were 0.271 (No-Rank), 0.289 (High-Rank), and 0.175 (Low-Rank).
The dashed lines indicate the medians: 0.448 (No-Rank), 0.489 (High-Rank),
and 0.626 (Low-Rank).
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0.0006, upper: 0.1480)] as hypothesized. Since the Bartlett test
of homogeneity of variances revealed significant inhomogeneity
(p = 0.02295), we also conducted Welch’s test (Welch, 1951)
(Welch’s ANOVA), which does not assume equal variances,
and found that the result was also significant (p = 0.003781).
Pairwise Welch’s t-tests with Bonferroni correction (corrected
significance level α = 0.0166) revealed significant differences
between High-Rank and Low-Rank (p = 0.003724, Keselman
and colleagues’ d1 = 0.610, d2 = 1.009) and between No-
Rank and Low-Rank (p = 0.006645, Keselman and colleagues’
d1 = 0.493, d2 = 0.763), but no difference between No-
Rank and High-Rank (p = 0.4713, Keselman and colleagues’
d1 = 0.148, d2 = 0.158). As the effect size measure, we
adopted Keselman and colleagues’ dj, because normality was
confirmed but variances were unequal and sample sizes were
unequal (Keselman et al., 2008; Peng and Chen, 2014). Even
if we take the smaller dj, effect sizes were not small between
High-Rank and Low-Rank, and between No-Rank and Low-
Rank.
In each of the No-Rank and High-Rank groups, there were
two (in total four) participants whose ratio of ‘play’ was 0
and one (in total two) whose ‘play’ ratio was 1, while there
was no such participant in the Low-Rank group. Excluding
these participants (in total six) did not largely change the
results described above: one-way ANOVA revealed a significant
effect [p = 0.0225, η2 = 0.0634 (95% confidence interval:
lower: 0.0005, upper: 0.1538)], Welch’s ANOVA also revealed
a significant effect (p = 0.006063), and pairwise Welch’s t-tests
with Bonferroni correction found significant differences between
High-Rank and Low-Rank [p = 0.004921, (Keselman and
colleagues’) d1 = 0.629 and d2 = 0.944] and between No-Rank
and Low-Rank (p = 0.009391, d1 = 0.494 and d2 = 0.713), but
no difference between No-Rank and High-Rank (p = 0.4779,
d1 = 0.153 and d2 = 0.159). These six participants were re-
included in the analyses described below, because it is uncertain
whether excluding them is valid or not given the nature of the
task.
Figure 4 shows how the play ratio for the non-positive
roulette wheels changed as trials progressed (Figure 4A: mean,
Figure 4B: median). As shown in the figure, once the presented
ranks stabilized at either high or low rank (at around the 10th
trial, Figure 1D), the play ratios in the three rank groups
started to diverge, and these differences were then kept rather
stably. This excludes the possibility that differences between
the rank groups appeared only at the end of the task. Indeed,
results of the aforementioned tests were not largely changed
when the last 10 trials (in addition to the initial 10 trials)
were excluded: one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect
(p = 0.0225, η2 = 0.0603 (95% confidence interval: lower:
0.0005, upper: 0.1473)) and Welch’s ANOVA also revealed a
significant effect (p= 0.004514), and pairwise Welch’s t-tests with
Bonferroni correction revealed significant differences between
High-Rank and Low-Rank (p = 0.003814, Keselman and
colleagues’ d1 = 0.611 and d2 = 0.995) and between No-Rank
and Low-Rank (p = 0.008373, d1 = 0.483 and d2 = 0.733), but
no difference between No-Rank and High-Rank (p = 0.4354,
d1 = 0.172, d2 = 0.160).
FIGURE 4 | How the ratio of ‘play’ for the non-positive roulette wheels
changed along with trials. (A,B) show the means and the medians,
respectively. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, and ∗p < 0.05 [one-way ANOVA for
each bin (including 10 trials), uncorrected for multiple comparison].
Figure 5A shows histograms of the play ratio (excluding
the initial 10 trials) for each roulette wheel in each rank
group. Figure 5B shows the medians, and Figure 5C shows
the medians and quantiles. As shown in Figure 5A, whereas
the shape of the distribution is largely similar across the rank
groups for the roulette wheels with positive EVs, the shape
appears to differ depending on the rank groups for the non-
positive roulettes. Indeed, the Kruskal–Wallis H-test revealed
significant differences between the rank groups for the 1:1 and
4:5 roulettes (Figure 5B), and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test
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FIGURE 5 | Detailed data of the ratio of ‘play’ (excluding the initial 10 trials) for each roulette wheel in each rank group. (A) Histograms. (B) Medians.
∗p < 0.05 (Kruskal–Wallis H-test, uncorrected for multiple comparison). (C) Medians and quantiles. ∗p < 0.05 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Mann–Whitney U-test),
uncorrected for multiple comparison: for the 1:1 roulette, No-Rank vs. High-Rank (p = 0.7367, r = 0.0341), No-Rank vs. Low-Rank (p = 0.0134, r = 0.2621), and
High-Rank vs. Low-Rank (p = 0.0184, r = 0.2948); for the 4:5 roulette, No-Rank vs. High-Rank (p = 0.6839, r = 0.0414), No-Rank vs. Low-Rank (p = 0.0140,
r = 0.2605), and High-Rank vs. Low-Rank (p = 0.0205, r = 0.2896); for the 1:2 roulette, No-Rank vs. High-Rank (p = 0.1566, r = 0.1438), No-Rank vs. Low-Rank
(p = 0.2225, r = 0.1293), and High-Rank vs. Low-Rank (p = 0.0363, r = 0.2617).
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(Mann–Whitney U-test) revealed significant differences between
High-Rank and Low-Rank for the three non-positive roulettes
and also between No-Rank and Low-Rank for the 1:1 and
4:5 roulettes (Figure 5C); non-parametric tests were used here
because some of the distributions prominently deviated from a
normal distribution as seen in Figure 5A and also in the results
of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (Table 2).
Figure 6 plots the same data as Figure 5C, separately showing
the play ratios for when the three different point amounts were
at stake. Overall tendencies appear to be similar regardless of the
point amount.
Figure 7 shows the cumulative points in the three rank groups.
As shown in the figure, during the middle of the task, the average
cumulative points diverged between High-Rank and Low-Rank
participants, with the former obtaining more points than the
latter. Since all the groups played exactly the same roulette
wheels, this disparity likely originates from differences in the
play ratio of roulette wheels with non-positive EVs: in an effort
to get more points, Low-Rank participants played non-positive
roulette wheels more frequently than High-Rank participants,
thereby losing more points. It is interesting to note that although
the ranks presented were not real, at the group level, rank
appears to have played a part in determining outcomes, in a
‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ fashion. This observation might suggest
a top–down effect of rank, with higher rank being a reinforcer
while lower rank is a punishment. It may appear inconsistent
that the cumulative points of Low-Rank participants did not go
below those of No-Rank participants, despite the differing play
ratio for non-positive roulette wheels between these two groups
as described above. This can be explained by the fact that the
difference in the play ratio between No-Rank and Low-Rank
groups was generally smaller than the difference between High-
Rank and Low-Rank groups (Figure 4), and especially so for
the most disadvantageous (Gain: Loss = 1: 2) roulette wheel
(Figures 5 and 6).
Table 3 shows the results of the GEE analysis (Liang and
Zeger, 1986; Ratcliffe and Shults, 2008; Weller et al., 2015) for
the sensitivity to differences in EVs in individual trials (11th to
120th, excluding the initial 10 trials). A significant main effect
of (normalized) EV was observed, with higher likelihood to
‘play’ as EV increased, i.e., as the roulette wheel became more
favorable. A main effect of Low-Rank was also significant: Low-
Rank increased the probability of ‘playing’. No significant effect
of trials, High-Rank, and no interactions between (normalized)
EV and ranks were observed. Table 4 shows the results of a
separate GEE analysis for the data of Low-Rank and High-
Rank participants only (i.e., excluding the data of No-Rank
participants). Similar to the results of the original GEE analysis
for all the rank groups, significant main effects of (normalized)
EV and of Low-Rank (vs. High-Rank), but no interaction between
(normalized) EV and Low-Rank (vs. High-Rank) were observed.
These results indicate that presentation of low ranks generally
increased the tendency to play, consistent with the results of the
analyses described above at least to a certain extent, and also that
presentation of low ranks did not change the sensitivity to EVs.
As described in the Additional Notes in the Section “Materials
and Methods,” for ethical and practical reasons, High-Rank
participants in the roulette task were presented with low ranks
in the experiment preceding the roulette task and vice versa.
The observed differences in the behavior in the roulette task
between the rank groups could thus potentially be effects of
rank presentation in the preceding task, especially given that
winning/losing causes changes in physiological states such as the
level of testosterone, which could in turn affect behavior (Mazur
and Booth, 1998; Casto and Edwards, 2016). In order to test
this possibility, we compared the behavior between No-Rank
participants who were presented with high ranks in the preceding
task (18 and 17 participants in the first and second session
of the preceding task, respectively) and No-Rank participants
presented with low ranks previously (16 and 10 participants in
the first and second session, respectively). The play ratio for
the non-positive roulette wheels (excluding the initial ten trials)
did not significantly differ between these groups (Welch’s t-tests:
p = 0.7542 for low vs. high ranks in the first session; p = 0.9080
for low vs. high ranks in the second session; p= 0.6531 for low vs.
high ranks in either session). We further conducted GEE analysis
with covariates of trials (11th to 120th), normalized EVs, Low-
Rank in the preceding task in both the first or second session
(dummy-coded), and a constant term specified in the model
and assuming the Markov correlation structure. This analysis
revealed no significant effect of the Low-Rank in the preceding
task [p= 0.7206 (robust covariance matrix-based results)]. These
results indicate that the observed differences between the rank
groups in the roulette task were likely to be caused by rank
presentation in the roulette task itself rather than by rank
presentation in the preceding task.
DISCUSSION
The present results demonstrate that awareness of one’s rank
amongst peers affects the tendency to make risky choices in
adolescent males in the natural classroom environment. Previous
studies have shown that adolescents tend to take more risks
TABLE 2 | p-values for Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for normality of the across-participant distributions of the ratio of ‘play’ for each roulette-wheel type.
Roulette-wheel
with gain:
loss = 2 : 1
Roulette-wheel
with gain:
loss = 5 : 3
Roulette-wheel
with gain:
loss = 1 : 1
Roulette-wheel
with gain:
loss = 4 : 5
Roulette-wheel
with gain:
loss = 1 : 2
No-Rank 0.05392 0.06438 0.2131 0.04771 0.362
High-Rank 0.3003 0.2103 0.6941 0.6308 0.2178
Low-Rank 0.1797 0.0611 0.6486 0.9547 0.9
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FIGURE 6 | The same data as Figure 5C separately for the three possible point amounts which could be gained or lost on each trial by playing.
∗p < .05 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Mann–Whitney U-test), uncorrected for multiple comparison).
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FIGURE 7 | Cumulative points along with trials in the three rank
groups. The thick lines and thin lines indicate the mean ± standard error for
each group. The top gray and black symbols indicate trials where there exists
a tendency of difference (p < 0.10) or a significant difference (p < 0.05),
respectively, between High-Rank and Low-Rank participants (t-test,
uncorrected for multiple comparison).
when they are surrounded or observed by peers than when they
are alone, presumably because the presence of peers constitutes
a social reward that can bias decision making (Gardner and
Steinberg, 2005; Chein et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2014). Our results
support this, and furthermore show that this increased risk-
taking is further enhanced by perception of low ranks amongst
peers. We originally hypothesized that presentation of low ranks,
or high ranks, or both would increase the ratio of choosing ‘play’
especially for roulette wheels with non-positive EVs. Our analyses
on the play ratio are consistent with this hypothesis, indicating
that only low ranks enhance the play ratios. The GEE analyses,
showing that presentation of low ranks increased the tendency
to play, also support our hypothesis at least to a certain extent,
while it was also suggested that presentation of low ranks did not
change the sensitivity to EVs.
Recent work has delved into the details of peer interactions,
showing that peer observation and peer advice have
distinguishable effects on risky decision making (Haddad
et al., 2014). Peer competition is also a typical type of peer
interaction, and recent work has suggested that winning/losing
in a competition is an intrinsic social reward/punishment (van
den Bos et al., 2013a,b). However, the effects of peer competition
on adolescent risk-taking have remained elusive and our results
provide a clue toward answering this question, at the same time
demonstrating the utility of smartphone technology to explore
these heretofore types of hard to reach questions.
A body of studies has examined the effects of status/hierarchy
amongst peers on aggressive/antisocial behavior in adolescents
and children (Coie et al., 1982; Xie et al., 2002; Prinstein and
Cillessen, 2003), finding that aggressive behavior is associated
with high popularity, low likability, and also with low popularity
to some extent (i.e., non-linear relation to popularity) (Prinstein
and Cillessen, 2003). The present study has implications to
these lines of research in two ways. First, while previous studies
have achieved classifications of types of aggressive behaviors,
we focused on a specific type of elementary cognitive function,
namely, decision making when faced with risky options. How
the tendency for risk-taking relates to the different types of
aggressive/antisocial behavior awaits future research. Second,
whereas previous studies examined the effects of existing, long-
term status, we introduced and manipulated temporary statuses
that were independent of existing hierarchies. It was expected
that effects would be observed given that adolescents might
be sensitive to temporary statuses due to their potentially
destabilizing effects on existing hierarchies, and our results
support this expectation.
A recent study (Zhu et al., 2016) examined how
winning/losing in a task with inter-group competition affects
the tendency for risk-taking in subsequent choice opportunities
in children. Intriguingly, compared to winners or control
participants who performed the task without inter-group
competition, it was observed that losers became risk-averse.
This differs from our results, and this might be explained by
several important differences between the two studies, including
the age of participants (adolescents aged 14–15 in the current
experiment vs. children 2–9 years old in Zhu et al., 2016),
inter-individual vs. inter-group competition, multiple choices
with risky options made during and affecting the competition
vs. a single choice made after the competition, and whether the
ranks (winning/losing) presented were fake or real. Exploring
how these factors relate to risk-taking tendencies would be
important in clarifying the relationships between risky behavior
in adolescents and peer competition.
In our experiments, even participants in the No-Rank group
were surrounded by their peers, and thus a basic effect of peer
presence on risk-taking might apply to them too. Consistent
with this, the play ratio for roulette wheels with negative EVs
in participants not presented ranks was around 30–40% at the
median, which is comparable to or even greater than the ratio
observed in a previous study where peer presence was a factor
(Smith et al., 2014) (note: participants in our study were 1–2 years
younger than participants in the previous study, 14–15 vs. 15–
17 years old). The interpretation of this is that awareness of one’s
own position amongst peers affects risky behavior in addition to
the basic peer effect.
The reason why awareness of being in a losing position
(Low-Rank) induced more risk-taking than awareness of being
in a winning position (High-Rank) needs further discussion.
Awareness of low rank may be taken as a social punishment,
and may make one eager to compensate by obtaining immediate
reward even when the level of risk is high. On the other hand,
those who are winning might be socially satisfied and as such not
want immediate reward so much unless it comes with low risk.
They may wish to retain their high position and thus would not
make choices which could jeopardize their high rank. Looking at
the behavioral economics literature, the prospect theory account
of risk-taking might provide a good interpretation for our results
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory implies that
misperceptions or uneven weighting of probability contribute to
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risky decision making. The misperceptions of probability have
been suggested (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010) to account for
the favorite-longshot bias (Griffith, 1949). It has further been
discussed (Thaler and Ziemba, 1988) that the favorite-longshot
bias would tend to become more prominent for the last races
of the day (McGlothlin, 1956) possibly due to loss aversion
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979): “Bettors on average are losing
toward the end of the day. They would like to go home a winner,
but do not want to risk losing much more money (quoted from
page 171 of Thaler and Ziemba, 1988),” although loss aversion
was not evident in recent data (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010).
The increase of the play ratio for the non-positive roulette
wheels in the Low-Rank group in our experiment could have a
similar origin. Specifically, it is possible that the longshot bias
was manifested particularly in the participants who were aware
of being in low ranking positions, although the probabilities to
win with the non-positive roulette wheels were not that low and
whether the overweighing of low probability actually occurred
seems unclear.
It is also possible that low-rankers made riskier choices
because they believed that attempting ‘longshots’ was the only
way to catch up to their competitors, even knowing that this type
of response was irrational in terms of point maximization. By the
same token, it seems as if participants put greater emphasis on the
‘social reward’ aspect of low rank than the ‘point reward’ on each
trial, causing in a bias toward a ‘longshot’ mentality. Potentially
contributing factors include how participants estimated the
rationality of the opponents and how they estimated the number
of remaining trials and the point differences between themselves
and the opponents. Also possibly involved was how important
the different ranks were to them (e.g., strongly preferring only
1st place or a linear rank preference), and how they differentially
preferred strategies of playing for their own point-gain as
compared to passing and waiting for the opponents to lose points
on their own. More elaborate experimental designs and analyses
will be needed to dissociate these possible factors. Nonetheless,
effects of the awareness of ranks on risk-taking related to any of
these factors can contribute to the observed problematic risky
behaviors in adolescents, and the present study demonstrated
that the awareness of even temporary ranks indeed has effects on
risk-taking.
Besides the abovementioned issues, there are several
limitations in the present study. First, here we examined
only adolescents, and comparisons with adults and children
would surely be interesting and informative. While conducting
comparable experiments for adults would not be easy given
that there are no exact counterparts to classmates or classrooms
(the office environment, while potentially applicable, presents
many different dynamics and variables), it may be possible
for young adults, i.e., college students. Second, all participants
were males; comparison with females would also be interesting
especially given the suggested relationships between testosterone
and competitive behavior (Mazur and Booth, 1998; van den
Bos et al., 2013a; Casto and Edwards, 2016). Third, all the
participants in the present study were students at the same junior
high school, and results might reflect specific characteristics
of that school. Fourth, participant ranks were not observed by
others in real time (although students compared their results
after the experiment without prompting). Even so we observed
significant effects; it would be interesting to examine situations
TABLE 3 | Effects of EV and ranks on playing/passing.
Variable β Standard error z-value p-value 95% CI
Lower limit Upper limit
Trials −2.0442 × 10−4 0.0011 −0.1915 0.8481 −0.0023 0.0019
Normalized EV 0.6734 0.0846 7.9549 1.7764 × 10−15 0.5075 0.8393
High-Rank −0.1249 0.2073 −0.6025 0.5469 −0.5313 0.2814
Low-Rank 0.4870 0.1768 2.7537 0.0059 0.1404 0.8336
Normalized EV × High- Rank 0.0777 0.1513 0.5137 0.6075 −0.2188 0.3742
Normalized EV × Low-Rank −0.0313 0.1603 −0.1955 0.8450 −0.3454 0.2828
Constant 0.5295 0.1285 4.1194 3.7983 × 10−5 0.2776 0.7815
GEE estimate of α = 0.21625.
TABLE 4 | Effects of EV and low, vs. high, ranks on playing/passing.
Variable β Standard error z-value p-value 95% CI
Lower limit Upper limit
Trials 7.6755 × 10−4 0.0015 0.4987 0.6180 −0.0022 0.0038
Normalized EV 0.7517 0.1255 5.9898 2.1007 × 10−9 0.5057 0.9977
Low-Rank (vs. High-Rank) 0.6123 0.2140 2.8610 0.0042 0.1928 1.0318
Normalized EV × Low-Rank (vs. High-Rank) −0.1076 0.1855 −0.5801 0.5618 −0.4711 0.2559
Constant 0.3410 0.1865 1.8287 0.0675 −0.0245 0.7065
GEE estimate of α = 0.23053.
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in which ranks can be seen by others. Fifth, the present work
examined temporary status, i.e., ranking among peers during
a short competition. Whether established (or slowly changing)
hierarchies show similar or different effects still remains an open
question. Sixth, it bears repeating that all gambles were a mixture
of gains, losses and zeroes. As gains and losses (and zeroes)
may be qualitatively different (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Weller et al., 2011; Yechiam and Hochman, 2013), mixing the
gambles potentially had specific effects in the current study.
Seventh, we did not assess pubertal timing, which potentially
affects the tendency for risky behavior. Finally, only behavioral
data were examined. Measurements or manipulations of neural
and hormonal systems have the potential to provide insights into
underlying physiological mechanisms.
To our knowledge, this study is one of the first demonstrations
of the effectiveness of using smartphone devices experimentally
in a school setting to reach the natural environment of
adolescents and provide acute manipulations of peer interactions.
The present results demonstrate the promise of smartphones
and mobile technology as tools to examine peer interactions in
the classroom. Taking advantage of this technology, we revealed
that awareness of being in a losing position amongst peers
induces more risk-taking than awareness of being in the lead
or complete non-awareness of ranks in adolescent males. Our
results have important implications for the development of
possible methods of intervention. Specifically, in order to prevent
risky behavior in adolescents, not only direct interventions,
but also interventions mitigating the feelings of inferiority
in competitive situations or hierarchies among peers may be
effective.
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